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I. INTRODUCTIOS' 
Society has become increasingly concerned with the appropriate pro- 
cedures for evaluating projects nhlch promise to yield long-run benefits, but 
also create potentially catastrophe consequences. Recent examples of such 
problems are the siting of energy facilities such as nuclear power plants or 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. 
Ths paper has two principal purposes. Utilizing recent theoretical and 
*This paper, prepared for the TIASA Tesk Force Meeting on Liquefied Energy Gases, reflects 
many helpful discussions wt!! llASA c o l l e a g ~ e s ~ o ~ m  Latirop, J o m e  herooth, Michiel 
Schwarz, Craig Sinclair, and Michael Thompson. Rendolph Deutsch, .!oh Lathrop and Ralph 
Keeney provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
empirical contributions to the literature on choice under uncertainty, it pro- 
poses a descriptive model as to how such decisions are reached in the  United 
States. On the basis of t h s  descriptive model, suggestions are made for improv- 
ing the process. The paper thus at tempts to integrate descriptive and prescrip- 
tive components for analyzing these societal problems. 
Section I1 sketches the elements of a descriptive model of the societal 
decisionmaking process. T h s  model describes the process of choice by indivi- 
dual parties, each of whom have specific goals and objectives, limited informa- 
tion which are guided by these objectives, and scarce computational resources. 
It is thus in the spirit of what Simon 11978) terms procedural rationality. The 
model extends these notions to the case where there are  several interested par- 
ties who must interact and arrive a t  a solution for a particular problem. Hence 
there is an additional layer of complexity imposed on the structure-the interac- 
tion between stakeholders who may have different objectives and hence 
differential information bases. 
Section I11 illustrates the descriptive model w t h  empirical evidence from 
the LNG siting decision process which has been studied extensively (see Ahern 
1980a; Deutsch 1980; Lathrop 1980; and Linnerooth 1980). The paper also util- 
izcs material from studies by Davis (1979) and the OfRce of Technology Assess- 
ment (1977) on tile nature of the LNG controversy in the United States. Section 
IV indicates how we might improve the  current  situation by recogniz~ng that  the  
descriptive process is based on a number of institutional and legal constraints 
wh ch  may be difficult to change. In developing these prescriptive measures, I 
will build on the concepts of decision analysis as applied to sitmg decisions (Kee- 
ney 1980), the concepts of assumptional analysis developed by Mitroff, Emshoff 
and Kilman (1979) as well as policy analysis. Section V provides a brief se t  of 
conclusions. 
11. DESCRIPTIVZ YODEL OF SOCIETAL DEC~SIOS!J!AKINC- 
Relevant C m c e p t s  
In contrast to most textbooks analyses of decisionmaking under uncer- 
tainty, where there is a well specified se t  of probabilities of certain events 
occurring and potential gains or losses from them, the problems discussed in 
this paper have grave uncertainties about them. For one t hng ,  there has not 
been a long history with which to build a statistical database. The technologies 
are  relatively new and in many cases past experience provides us w t h  h i t e d  
guidance as to the chances of severe accidents occurring. In a similar vein one 
has to  speculate as to what the losses might be should a particular catastrophic 
event occur in a given location. These two elements of uncertainty represent a 
challenge for both risk analysis and decisionmahng. 
On the analysis side, there is a need to  systematically estimate probabilities 
and consequences from both past data and judgmental studies. There is an  
extensive literature from controlled laboratory experiments over the past  
decade which have uncovered a set of biases and heuristics that individuals util- 
ize in dealing with low probability events (Fischhoff, e t  al. in press; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). Other studies have suggested that the context in whch  a prob- 
lem is framed plays a key role in how people make their decisions (Hershey, e t  
al. 1980; Tversky and Kahnernan in press). These findings, partly due to compu- 
tational limitations on the part  of individuals, present a challenge to the analyst 
who would like to improve the decisionmaking process. An attempt in t h s  direc- 
tion has been taken by Fairley (1977) who provides a detailed set  of guidelines 
for estimating "small" accident probabilities based on a consideration of catas- 
trophic risk analyses for LNG marine transportation. His motivation for sug- 
gesting systematic analyses, is that there is a great danger that many sources of 
an accident will otherwise be omitted. In addition, there are numerous oppor- 
tunities for bias with respect to judgmental estimates of accident probabilities 
when there is n o t  a long hlstory of past events. Similar reasoning would apply to 
the analysis of losses from a given accident, such as a major breach of an  LNG 
tank. 
On the decisionmaking side, the lack of a detailed database implies that 
different stakeholders or interested parties will have different estimates of the 
probabilities and the losses that guide their own judgments. I will look a t  the 
process in terms of a scenario involving a number of different decisions, which 
taken together resolve a particular problem. Some of the decisions may be 
solved in parallel by different parties; others may be dealt with sequentially. 
The d e c e n t ~ a l i z e d  a n d  sequent ia l  n a t u ~ e  of the  p o c e s s  are key concepts 
which guide the descriptive analysis. March (1978) characterizes this process as 
one of limited rationahty, whereby individuals and groups simplify a large prob- 
lem into smaller pieces because of the dimculties they have in considering all 
alternatives and all information. Support for these concepts a t  the level of 
governmental, firm and consumer decisionmaking ccmes from several quarters. 
L inc ! ' . ~~m (i959, 1965) emphasizes the incrementalism in decisions made by 
bureaucracies where the12 is a tendency for government agencies to  "muddle 
through" by making small changes from the status quo rather than attempting 
to structure and solve a larger problem. Cyert and March (1963), in their classic 
study of the behavioral theory of the firm, provide empirical evidence on this 
behavior by showing how organizations decentralize decisions and attend to 
different goals and objectives a t  different times. BeLtmann (1979) integrates 
findings from a number of studies and suggests that the consumer simplifies the 
decision making process by decompartmentalizing the problem, utilizing limited 
search, and behaving sequentially with appropriate feedback loops. 
Another important concept, which also relates to  the uncertainty of infor- 
mation on probabilities and losses, is the importance o j  ezogenous events  in 
influencing the decision process. Random events, such as disasters, play a criti- 
cal role in triggering speciflc actions to  "prevent" tuture crises. The small data 
base for judging the frequency of low probability events, coupled with systematic 
biases of individuals in dealing with concepts of chance and uncertainty, 
increases the importance of a salient event in the decisionmaking process. Tver- 
sky and Kahneman (1973) describe this phenomenon under the heading of avai- 
labihty, whereby one judges the frequency of a event by the ease with whlch one 
can retr iele i t  from memory. The importance of past experience in influencing 
consumer 6ecisions to purchase insurance against low probability events (Kun- 
reuther, et al. ! 978) reflects this characteristic of human behavior. In a similar 
spirit, Karc i l  and Olsen (1976) suggest that random events and their timing play 
a critical role in many arganizational decisions because of the ambiguity of 
;,tany situi. Lions and tne limited attention that can be given to any particular 
problem by the interested parties unless i t  is perceived as being critical. They 
provide empirica: evidence to support their theory using empirical studies of 
erg? ?izations in senmark,  Norway, and the United States. 
Hith respecl to legislative decisionmaking. Walker (1977) suggests the 
importance of graphically and easily understood evidence of trouble as an 
important factor in setting the discretionary agenda of the U.S. Congress or a 
government agency. He also suggests that the political appeal of dealing with a 
specific problem is increased if it has an impact on large numbers of people. To 
support these points, Walker presents empirical evidence on the passage of 
safety legislation in the U.S. Kurnerous examples of this process are also pro- 
vided by 1,awless (1977) through a series of case histories of problems involving 
the impact cif technology on society. He points out that  frequently: 
new information of an "alarming" nature is announced and is 
given rapid and widespread visibility by means of modern 
mass communications media. Almost overnight the case can 
become a subject of discussion and concern to  much of the 
populace, and generate strong pressures to  evaluate and 
remedy the problem as rapidly as possible. (p.16) 
In the case of decisions such a s  the siting of facilities, random events such 
as an LNG explosion or an oil spill may be sufficiently graphic and affect enough 
people to .cause a reversal of earlier decisions, inject other alternatives into the 
process and change the relative strength of parties interested in the decision 
outcome. The mass media may play critical role in focusing on these specific 
events and in many cases exaggerating their importance. 
Model F o n n d a t i o n  
The concepts d i scused  above have motivated the following descriptive 
model sf the societel decisionmaking process. A scenario consists of a sequence 
of decisions ID1, . . ,  Dnj,  which have to be made by different interested parties. 
In focusing on any particular problem, i t  is necessary to  specify what the n 
different decisions are  that  comprise a particular scenario. For example, Ahern 
(1980a) and Linnerooth (1980) have constructed a detailed flow diagram of the  
different decision points with respect to the siting of the LNG terminal in Califor- 
nia. Here the process begins with the Western LNG Terminal Company fling a n  
application w ~ t h  the Federal Power Commission ( P C )  for terminal facilities. It 
continues through a se t  of interactions between federal, s tate and local govern- 
mental agencies, as consumer groups and the Western LNG Terminal. In the 
case of the nuclear power plant licensing decision Jackson and Kunreuther 
(1980) have constructed a scenario which emphasizes the decentralized nature 
of decisions by separate divisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The 
performance of a plant under a series of predetermined accident scenarios is a 
basis for the flnal decision as to whether or not to approve a power plant. 
These two examples suggest that, although one can look at  a particular 
decision in isolation, it will be integrated with other actions by bemg dependent 
on earlier decisions (e.g., the LNG siting decision) or by being integrated a t  a 
later stage with other decisions which are made independently of it (e.g., the 
licensing of nuclear power plants). 
Consider a particular decision, D - ,  (e.g., the safety of an LNG terminal) J 
which is part of a overall scenario. F~gure 1 depicts the relevant aspects of the 
Frocess. At any time period, t, there are a set of e z o g e n o v s  factors which limit 
the set of alternatives for consideration. For example, a disaster may trigger 
specific legislation whch provides restrictions on where an LNG terminal can be 
located. The inpxt  phase of the process involves the relationship between the 
set of zlternatives and the relevant stakeholders and attributes or measurable 
in; - -. zts :e g . ,  numbel of lives lost from an LNG explosion) whch are considered 
important by a t  least one of the interested parties. There is a clear interaction 
between stakeholders and attributes: as one changes the composition of stake- 
holders then the relative importance of attributes also changes. For example, if 
public interest groups have a voice in the site selection process then the safety 
factor may be treated as much more relevant than if these parties did not have 
an input into the final decision. Similarly if certain attributes are specdcally 
introduced into the picture by one of the ~nterested parties, then this may cause 
other groups to play a more active role in the process. For example, if the 
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federal government suggests the critical lrnportance of safety factors as part of 
the siting decision, then concerned citizens may unite to prevent their comrnun- 
ity from being chosen as a site. 
Each interested party is likely to have a different set of attributes that they 
consider to  be important to the particular problem. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that  two interested parties who focus on the same attribute will meas- 
ure it in the same manner. For example, public interest groups concerned with 
the safety of potential sites may have a different estimate of the number of lives 
lost from a severe accident then the gas companies or the conscrtium proposing 
the project. Over time the nature and importance of these attributes may also 
change due to exogenous factors and a new set  of alternatives. 
When it comes to  the analysis phase, stakeholders are  llkely to evaluate 
different alternatives by loolang for satisfactory options rather than trying to  
find an  optimal solution (Cyert and March 1963). For eachdecision D- there may J 
be some level of a particular attribute that is deemed satisfactory, but whose 
value may dif?er between interested parties. For example, public interest 
groups may view the acceptable level of risk for a large accident to be somewhat 
lower than the gas company proposing the project. As a result these two 
interested parties may have differing views on the acceptability of alternative 
sitez. When such conflicts occur, they may cause long delays in reachng a final 
decision because there are no clear responsibilities between dfierent  agencies. 
Eventually they may be resolved through some form of consensus by the 
interested parties, by court rulings or by governmental bodies with specific leg- 
islative powers t o  settle the controversy. For some problems no resolution may 
take place and the  status quo is maintained. 
Loohng at  Figure :, a critical question is the nature of stakeholder 
confltcts. If there is a call for more information, this is treated in the figure as 
being equvalent to postponing action until the next period. In period t-1, a set 
of random events may occur that  substantially change the situation. The breach 
of a gas tank or the discovery of an earthquake fault may reveal certain features 
of facilities or sites whch  may make them unacceptable. These random events 
may change the relative importance of different stakeholders and attributes. In 
addition, the events and the public's reaction to them may trigger new legisla- 
tion whch  deem certain previously satisfactory alternatives unacceptable and 
force a re-evaluation of earlier decisions ID1 ..,, Dj-ij. 
To summarize, there are a set  of decisions which have to be made over time 
as part of a scenario lor a particular problem. There are laws and regulations 
which guide the acceptability of specific alternatives and there are different 
stakeholders involved in the process. Because of the uncertainty of information 
regarding probability and potential impacts of catastrophic events, interested 
pa *ties with different goals and objectives and with limited computational capa- 
cities may have different estimates of the risks associated with specific actions 
(e.g..  the safety of an LNG terminal a t  a particular location). Furthermore, ran- 
dom eveilts in period t ;-in have a major impact on the decisionmaking process 
by t r i g g e r q  new legislation whch change the se t  of alternatives, relevant 
st~kt!holders and attributes for consideration. Conflicts between relevant stake- 
holders can lead to lengthy delays with respect to taking final action. 
111. THE LNG SITING DECISION I N  THE UNITED STATES 
The above descriptive model, outlined in Figure 1,  will be illustrated by 
analyzing the decision process associated with siting an LNG terminal in the US. 
I will first describe the nature of the problem, delineate the relevant.stakehold- 
ers  and attributes perceived to be important and then discuss the role of exo- 
- 1: - 
genous factors in the decision process. 
N a t u r e  01 the  P r o b l e m  
Liqllefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy w h c h  requires a 
fairly complicated technological process that  has the potential, albeit with very 
low probability, of c r e a t i ~ g  severe losses. To import LNG the gas has to be con- 
verted to liquid form at  about 1 /600 the volume. I t  is shipped in specially con- 
structed tankers and received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification 
and is then distributed. The entire system (i.e., the liquefication facility, the 
LNG tanker and the receiving terminal and regasification facility) can cost more 
than 3: billion to construct (Office of Technology Assessment 1977). The siting 
problem of interest consists of two principal decisions: whether proposed faclli- 
ties for regasifying and shpping LNG is in the national interest (Dl), and if so. 
whether the proposed site is considered safe enough (DZ). 
In t e re s t ed  P a r t i e s  and R e l e v a n t  A t t r i bu t e s  
According to the descriptive model, there wll be a set  of interested partles 
,zciated with each of these decisions. Some of these stakeholders will be 
specifled by law (e.g.,  government agencies), others will play a role because of 
specific concerns with the hazard (e.g.,  public interest groups) and others 
because of their economic interest in the project (e .g. ,  gas comparues). In the 
case of D , ,  there are two principal stakeholders, each of whom considers 
different attributes as important to their decision process. The g a s  c o m p a n y  or 
the consortium proposing the project conducts the site selection process by 
considering such attributes as accessibility by large tankers, availability of the  
market, i .e . ,  proximity of an existing pipeline network, cost of land acquisition, 
availability of skilled labor supply, and in some cases, land use characteristics 
and environmental factors (OTA 1977). The other interested party is the Depar t -  
mat of E n e r g y ,  whch  has to determine whether an  individual LNG import pro- 
ject is in the public interest and should be allowed.' If the project involves 
foreign imports, then the responsibility resides with the Economic Regulatory 
Agency [ERA); if the  terminal involves interstate commerce then the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is involved. 
According to the National Gas Act of 1973 which governs all imported 
natural gas cases, the Department of Energy (DOE) cannot approve any project 
which is not consistent with the public interest. Among the principal attributes 
that  DOE is supposed to consider in making this judgment are factors such as 
the security of supply, the proposed LNG price m relation to  the price cf alterna- 
tive supplies, impact of the price schedule on conservation of energy, and 
whether the proposed site meets safety and environmental requirements as 
stated in any national guidelines (DOEIERA 1977). 
The current  decisic.3 process is an-attempt to reduce conficts between the 
F-rties: the gas compmy or consortium proposes a site which they consider to 
be s a i  - and in the national interest. Relevant agencies of the Department of 
Energy then evalaate this site and issue an  opinion as t o  whether or not i t  
satisfies their criteria for the national interest.2 If it does. then the question of 
safety of the site (UZ) is analyzed. Otherwise, revisions in the  proposed site have 
to be made by the gas company or consortium. 
Even i f  a site is considered to be in the national'interest it does not mean 
that  it will necessarily satisfy the safety guidelines of other federal agencies as 
well as local interests. Other relevant stakeholders or parties now enter the 
scene, each of whom has a set of attributes for consideration. The W c e  of R p e -  
line S a f e t y  (OPSO) is concerned that the facilities comply with the safety code 
of the National Fire Protection Association as well as  the uniform building code 
with respect to maximum earthquake specifications. Another interested party 
is the Coast h a r d  who has jurisdiction over the entire portion of the LNG sys- 
t em that connects the  tanker to the distribution system. Recently the Coast 
Guard has issued a se t  of regulations which apply to terminal siting, so that  t h s  
agency is now an interested party. 
A t  the local level, groups such as the my Council play a key role in deter- 
mining whether or  not a particular site satisfies their safety standards. In Cali- 
fornia there a re  two other agencies: the California Coastal Commission (CCC) 
and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), both of whom have leg- 
islative responsibilities for determining whether a particular site is acceptable 
on the basis of local standards. In addition, there are  frequently public i n f m e s t  
groups who are  concerned with the environmental safety unpact  of specific pro- 
posed sites. 
Prior to 1977 there first had to be approval a t  the city or  community level 
(e.g., by the Los Angeles City Council), and then a t  the state level through the 
CPUC. Both groups had to hold hearings to determine whether all interests were 
bemg served. Since I977 the process a t  the state level has  been centralized 
through the passage of the LNG Terminal Sitirg Act of I977 whereby the Califor- 
nia Public Utilities Commission was given sole authority t o  issue a siting permit. 
The concept of acceptable risk has played a key role in the analysis of the 
relative safety of particular projects, but as we shall see  below it has also 
created obstacles for final approval. The following procedure is employed: a 
detailed risk analysis of a proposed site specifies the chances of death per year 
(p) from LNG-related accidents to an  indindual a t  risk. If p is below some thres- 
hold level, pS,  then the project is considered safe; if p > p* then it  is not. The 
value of p* currently used by the FERC is 10-? (i.e.. 1 in 1@ rnillron) (OTA 1977). 3 
Role gf E z o g e n o m  Events 
What is most interesting about the tustorical record regarding these siting 
decrsions, is the tremendous uncertainties associated with the flnal choice. 
Each interested party focuses on limited mformation and uses the data in 
different ways. Due to the difficulty of resolving stakeholder confhcts, a particu- 
lar event can cause a reversal or reinvestigation of a particular decision if the 
case has not been finalized. Consider the four following examples: 
1. In 1973 an LNG tank in Staten Island, New York, exploded and the roof 
collapsed burying 40 workers. There was no LNG in the tank but it had 
seeped through the insulation and caused a huge fire. A result of t h s  
explosion was the  increased concern with the dangers of LNG by Staten 
Island residents. The neighborhood organization called BLAST, which 
was formed a year before the accident, at tracted considerable at ten- 
tion and interest because of the media coverage of the  tank explosion. 
In the context of the presented model (see Figure 1) a new interested 
party played a key role because of a random event. What may have 
been a foregorie decision regarding the location of an LNG tank in Sta- 
ten  Island became problematica! (Davis 1979). 
2.  The worst LYG accident occurred in 1944 when the storage tank 
operated by the East Ohio Gas Company in Cleveland ruptured, spilling 
LNG on adjacent s t ree ts  and sewers. The liquid evaporated, the gas 
lgnited and exploded, resulting in 128 deaths,  300 injuries and approxi- 
mately 57 million in property damage. An investigation of t h s  accident 
indicated that  the tank failed because ;t was constructed of 3.5% nickel 
steel,  which becomes brittle when it comes in contact with the  extreme 
cold of LNG. All plants are  no:v b u ~ l t  with 9% nickel steel, aluminum or 
concrete and the storage tanks are  surrounded by dikes capable of 
containkg the contents of the tank if a rupture occurs. T h s  example 
illustrates the  impact of a particular incident on new regulations, 
which otherwise may not have been passed. 
In December of 1976, the Los Angeles City Council voted to allow work 
to begir: on an  LNG terminal in San Pedro Bay. The following day a n  
explosion r ~ p p e d  the oil tanker Sansinena in Los Angeles harbor leaving 
9 dead nd 50 injured. A week later the City Council commissioned a 
study as  to the relative safety of the proposed site. They later 
approveli the terminal. This explosion, although it had nothing to do 
with liq~;?ficd natural gas, alerted many Californians to the  potential 
dengers of LNG. 
4. Until the publication of the worst case scenario in 1976 on the possible 
consequences of a 96300 million terminal in Oxnard in California, there 
was almost unanimous agreement by all stakeholders tha t  Oxnard 
would be an i ~ e a l  site for an LVG terminal. At the time even the Sierra 
Club was in favor of this location. (They changed their feelings about 
Oxnard in 1977.)- A worst case scenario indicated tha t  a spill of 125,000 
cubic meters of LNG from all five tanks on a tanker would cause a 
vapor cloud which would affect 50,000 people. Residents could look on 
a map to determine whether the cloud covered one's own house (Ahern 
19BOa). No est imate of a probability was attached to this scenario. The 
graphic depict;on of these consequences generated a public reaction 
by a small group organized by concerned citizens of Ventura County. 
The California legislature was influenced by t h s  public reaction. One 
legislative staff member stressed that  it was not possible to allow a site 
that would lead to a large number of deaths in a c a t a ~ t r o ~ h e . ~  Hence. 
new siting regulations were passed stating that  no more than an  aver- 
age of 10 people per square mile could be within one mile of the termi- 
nal and no more than 60 within four miles of the terminal. The 
President's National Energy Plan incorporated similar population 
guidelines which effectively ruled out any high density areas as candi- 
dates for an LNG terminal. 
In the case of California, Point Conception replaced Oxnard as  the lead- 
ing candidate for locating a n  LNG terminal. The introduction of Point 
Conception into the picture changed the responsibility for approving 
the site at the federal level. The ERA handles all cases where there is 
no interstate commerce whlle the FERC handles cases where there 
may be shipments of gas from other states. Oxnard involved s h p m e n t s  
of gas from Indonesia only, so it came under the  jurisdiction of the 
ERA. In the case of Point Conception, gas would be s h p p e d  from 
Alaska as well  as from Indonesia, so the FERC now maintains primary 
responsibility {DOEIERA 1977, p.38). The FERC conditionally approved 
Point Conception subject to state and local acceptance. 
T h s  example illustrates how the context in w h c h  information is 
presented (i .e. ,  a worst case scenario) may provoke strong reactions 
by i r terested parties and eventually lead to legislative changes. 
The picture pajilted in the four scenarios above highlights the critical role 
that  institutional arrangements (e .g . ,  the relationshp between different 
interested parties) end legal considerations (e.g.,  specific regulations) play with 
respect to public po!icy decisions. What is also signficant, is the importance of 
specific events Ln triggering new coalitions and frequently new legislation. 
Where there are  conflicts of interest between different parties, the balance 
of power normally lies with the stakeholder who is in the position to make the 
final decision. In the case of California, the key question was whether the Cali- 
fornia Energy Commission (CEC) or the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) would have final siting authority regarding the safety issue (i.e., DZ). 
Once CPUC was chosen over the more conservation-minded CEC as the agency 
with sole state permit authority, then the final decision regarding a site was 
probably different than it would have been had CEC played thrs role. Here again, 
the dynamics of the process had a critical bearing on the final decision. 
IV. SUGGESTIOXS FOR IMPROVING THE 9ECISION PROCESS: 
PRESCRIPTIVE ILVALY SIS 
Thls section, explores the  role of prescriptive analysis given the descriptive 
model of choice specified above and the empirical data on LNG siting decision in 
the Lnited States. I will focus on three techniques: decision analysis, assump- 
tional analysis, interactire computer mcdels, and policy analysis. 
Rol,: 3f Decision Analysis 
An appropriate starting point is to determine how decision analysis may aid 
in this process. Keeney (1980) has shown how this approach can apply to struc- 
turing the siting decision but has focused primarily on a single decisionmaker 
rather than more than one interested party with 'conflictmg objectives and 
different information bases. Many of the general concepts proposed by Keeney 
are  relevant for the problem treated here. It is particularly important to 
specify the set  of decisions ID1, ..., Dn] that  have to be made, how they relate to 
each other, the role each stakeholder is Likely to play with respect to each of the 
n decision points, and the relevant at tnbutes that each of them are likely to  
utilize. It would be useful for each stakeholder to rank the relative importance 
of certain attributes as part of their final decision process. 5 
Thls 1s a time consuming process, but an important first step toward under- 
standing what the critical differences are  likely to be between interested parties 
in their evaluation of specific decisions. A t  the end of this process there is likely 
to  be a recognition that to go any further with formal analysis, such as estimat- 
ing utilities and probabilities of events occurring, would be tedious and not likely 
to yield benefits concommitant with the costs of undertaking thls task. Further- 
more, the different interested parties may feel that  such a process would not be 
descriptive of their own behavior. 
An alternative approach does present itself. Rather than trying to analyze 
each of the n subdecisions independently, it may be possible to focus on the final 
objective and examine the factors whlch influence the choice process. For 
example, in S e c t i ~ n  111 the final objective was determirung "an appropriate site, 
if any, In Califorrua for locating an LNG terminal." I t  should then be possible to  
construct a strategylstakeholder matrix, such as the one represented in Figure 
2 which in t h s  case lists three possible sites and four types of stakeholders. 
Figure 2. Stakeholder-Strategy Yatrix for LNG Siting Decisions 
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Coupled with this matrix one can also construct for each interested party a 
strategylat tr ibute matrix, whlch lists all possible considerations in judging the 
relative attractiveness of different sites. An example of t h s  matrix is presented 
in Figure 3. The challenge, of course, is to fill in the  cells of these two 
Figure 3. Attribute-Strategy Matrix for LNG Siting Decisions. 
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matrices w h c h  represent  the perception of dLfierent sites by respective stake- 
holders (Figure 2) and how each site scores on  each of the different attributes 
(r igure 3). The final matrix to complete the circle, is a stakeholderlattribute 
matrix such as the o r e  shown in Figlure 4. 
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Figure 4. Stakeholder-Attribute Matrix for LNG Siting Decisiors 
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such as decision analysis. Different stakeholders are  l~kely  to rank sites 
differently (Figure 2), will assign different costs and benefits to the attributes a t  
each site (Figure 3) and will weigh the relative importance of each attribute 
differently (Figure 4). On the other hand, these matrices force the parties to 
recognize the tradeoffs in making a decision and hence reduce the relative 
importance of random events. These discrepancies may producs stakeholder 
confiicts which should be treated explicitly. 
Use of Assumptional Analysis 
One way to help understand and possibly reconcile differences between par- 
ties is to perform some type of assumptional analysis, such as the one developed 
by Mitroff, Emshoff, and ~ i l m a n n  (1979). The authors have proposed a dialecti- 
cal approach to strategic plannmg by forcing individuals to state the most 
important assumptions guiding their analysis and then to  defend their position. 
Hajoce (1979) has suggested that the knowledge base on which to make deci- 
sions lor these types of problems is so inadequate that  such a process will 
r nable one to explore avenues of disagreement and improve their understanding 
of the problem. In the above example, a n  a t tempt  would be made to define the  
import: ~t attributes influencing each stakeholder's attitudes toward different 
sites, the weight given to each attribute and the impact that  each of the 
different sites will have on each attribute. 
If there are  conficts among stakeholders through this type of analysis, i t  
may be necessary to evaluate the impact of choosing one site in period t should 
certain events occur in period t + l  and future periods. Mitroff, e t  al. ,  discuss 
this process by asking what the impact will be if one chooses site 1, 2 or 3 based 
on certain assumptions whlch turn out to be false. They classify three types of 
errors of a policy assumption: (1) the real cost; (2) the visible cost; and (3) the 
reversibility cost. In terms of our example, there will be certain costs associ- 
ated with any LNG siting decision should an event occur in future period; (e.g.,  
a n  explosion) which changes the estimates of the costs and benefits of &fferent 
states. By having conflictmg opinions represented and examining the implica- 
tions of a range of alternatives under different assumptions the rationality and 
legitimacy of decisions should be improved. 
Role of Interactive Computer Models 
If it is impossible to bring the &fferent interested parties together, then 
other techniques may have to be used w h c h  involve indirect confrontation. One 
of the most promising approaches in theory, but one that  has not been success- 
fully applied in policy situations, is the development of interactive computer 
models for scenario generation. Th~s  type of decision support system would 
enable each interested party to construct h s / h e r  own scenario as to potential 
consequences of adopting one strategy over another. Having already con- 
structed different matrices such as the ones shown in Figures 2 through 4, each 
rtsk?holder would be in a position to articulate the potential consequences of 
s a j .  locating an  LAG Lerminal a t  Oxnard, Port of Los Angeles. or Point Concep- 
tion. At t h s  point it would be possible to develop not only "worst case 
scenarios," but also less extreme situations, including the possibility that no 
accident occurs. 6 
There undoubtedly will be differences between the way interested parties 
view the situation, but the advantage of the interactive computer models is that  
these drfferences can  ihen be openly discussed. In developing these scenarios, 
one can separate out the uncertainties, such a s  the probability of a particular 
situation occurring, from the more concrete data such as the losses which would 
take place conditional upon a particular event. One can then analyze separately 
very uncertain data (such as probability information) without linking them 
closely to a stream of events. Fairley's (1977) excellent discussion on dficult ies 
associated with estimating low probabilities and their result~ng consequences 
could then serve as a basis for a detailed exploration of this issue through sensi- 
tivity analyses. For example, suppose one estimated the annual probability of a 
severe accident to be between PI and P2 with losses ranging from L1 to  L2. One 
could then develop scenarios which examine the relative merits of different 
alternatives as one changed these estimates. If specific sites were preferred 
over a wide range of values for probabilities and losses then this would simplify 
the choice process. If  the ranlungs changed as Pi and L. were varied, then this J 
would suggest that these estimates be refined. 
The resolution of conflicts between interested parties may be extremely 
difficult even if one uses an assurnptional analysis approach or constructs 
scenar ips  using an interactive modeling system. In fact, the descriptive model 
described in Sect i~r .  !I suggests that  interested may not want to  get  
tcgether to so1~-e a particular problem unless they are forced to by existing 
iegislatlcn. Reconciliation of stakeholder confbcts is a time consuming and 
th rea t r2~ng  process siace i t  involves detailed analysis on the par t  of each of the 
groups and acceptance of responsibility for one's actions. From a political 
standpoint, t h s  may not always be the wisest thlng to do. Hence. the above 
prescriptive suggestions can only be viewed as a starting point for developing a 
dialogue. The h a 1  solution is likely to hinge on explicit legislation as to who 
"should" bear the costs of adoptlng certain measures. In the next subsection we 
briefly consider a set of policy options which may help reconci1.e these conflicts. 
Use 91 Policy Analysis 
There are three general classes of policy options which should be con- 
sidered: (;) use of market  mechanisms; (2) development of incentive systems; 
and (3) regulatory m e c h a n i ~ m s . ~  In determining which one or combination of 
these three measures could be utilized, it is necessary to determine who is 
responsible for damages should an accident occur. 
I will illustrate how these options can be utilized in facilitating the LNG sit- 
ing decision; similar analysis can be undertaken for other policy decisions which 
affect a number of interested parties. In the case of LNG there are many 
different facilities whch  can cause an accident (e.g.. s h p s ,  tanks, etc.) so it may 
be diEcult to  attribute fault to any one party. Furthermore, the ships, the LNG 
itself, and the terminals are  owned by different subsidiaries or companies. The 
local, national and international jurisdictions make legal problems even more 
difficult (Davis 1979). 
If LNG accidents are  viewed primarily as a private responsibility by the gas 
consortium or supplier, then some form of insurance is the logical market  
rneclianism to utilize. A General Accounting Omce (GAO) report of July 1978 con- 
cluded that injured parties could not be fully compensated for a serious 
acci'ent under present liability arrangements. For this reason, market 
mechanisms with insurance firms providing adequate protection are  not likely t o  
cover all damages and there may be a reluctance on the par t  of gas companies 
or consortiums to invest in LNG projects unless the government provides some 
insurance against catastrophe losses. 
With respect to incentive s y s t ems ,  it may be possible to provide special 
compensation to homeowners and individuals who reside in  areas where LNG 
facilities are constructed. If land values drop then some type of lump sum pay- 
ment might be desirable. Lower energy ri?tes can also compensate residents for 
the increased risk of having a n  LNG terminal in their "back yard." Terminal own- 
ers  who saw a need for  a liability fund could finance it by a tax  on LYG sales. 
These types of subsidies and taxes would shift some of the economic burden 
from those bearlng the physical risk to residents and businesses who are  
benefiting from the  facilities. If the government feels that  the LNG terminals 
yield substantial public benefits, then they may want to cover catastrophic 
losses through special funds such as those earmarked by the Price Anderson Act 
for nuclear accidents. Note tha t  each of the above incentive systems implies a 
set  of value judgments as to  whom should benefit and whom should bear the 
costs of const:-ucting LNG facilities. 
Finally, it  may be deemed desirable to have special regulations to protect 
the public from certain risks. Legislation, with respect  to location of LNG termi- 
nals, have recently reflected this concern by requiring certain conditions on 
population density around an LNG terminal as well as specifying certain con- 
structicn standards on tanks and dikes around the  terminal. As pointed out 
above, many of these regulations were passed because of some specific accident 
or crisis that  pointed out the need for these provisions. 
By adopting any of these policy recommendations one is implicitly (If not 
expliclt~y) answer.r,g questions as to the weight tha t  should be assigned to each 
of the relevant stakeholders in any evaluation process. Furthermore, the adop- 
tion of any policy provides guidelines as to how society views the tradeoff 
between efficiency and distributional considerations. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
At the hear t  3f the  prob!em for societal decisionmaking on low probability 
events is the increasing recognition that  there is great uncertainty on the data  
necessary to undertake any analysis: the probability of a loss occurring, conse- 
quences of dsas te r s  of dfferent  magnitudes, and how well certain protective 
measures will mitigate these losses. I t  is thus not surprising that  there are  
large difTerences in stakeholder estimates on these figures. 
A s  I have tried to emphasize in this paper, this situation causes a se t  of 
dynamics that are  only partially predictable because of the occurrence of ran- 
dom events. On the other hand, there are  ways of directly addressing the  prob- 
lem by h a v i ~  policy makers indicate what aspects should be viewed as private 
and public responsibilities, who should benefit and lose by any set of decisions, 
and what actions in the form of market mechanisms, incentives or regulations 
should be taken to produce a particular effect. The results may d a e r  from what 
o t e  expects, however, because one is dealing with a situation fraught with uncer- 
tainty on most &mensions. The challenge in dealing with societal decision mak- 
ipn, for low probability events is to be resilient in the face of uncertainty. Any 
other strategy is likely to prove catastrophic. 
NOTES 
1. Prior to  1977 this responsibility resided with the Federal Power Commission 
( FP c). 
2 .  An example of one vf these reports ,  with its f u l l  documentation, is DOE/ERA 
(1977). 
3. Keeney, e t  al. (1979) utilize this figure in support  of the acceptability of a 
p r o ~ o s e d  LaSalle terminal. They claim in this case that  i t  is less than 2% of 
10- , so tha t  the societal risk due  to  operation of the  terminal is m u c h  less 
the OTA's criterion for social acceptance which appears  t o  have originally 
been proposed by S ta r r  (1969). 
4. This comment was made t o  John Lathrop in a n  interview in Sacramento,  
California, in July 1980, regarding the siting process of an LNG terminal. 
2 
5 .  3ee Kecney and Raiffa (1976) for a more detailed discussion a s  to tech-  
niques for ranking these attributes.  
6. This approach differs from decision analysis by focusing on individual 
scenarios ra ther  than a probability distribution over outcomes. For a more  
detailed discussion of decision support  systems see  Keen and Scott  Morton 
(1978). 
7. A more detailed discussion of the  tradeoffs between the advantages and 
disadvantages of these methods appears  in Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978). 
REFERENCES 
Ahern, William. 198C; . "California Meets the LNG Terminal." Coasta l  Z o n e  
M a n a g e m e n t  J o u r n a l ,  7: 185; 22 1. 
Ahern, W. 1980b. "The Role of Technical Analyses in California Energy Facility 
Siting Decisions." Paper prepared for the  L.E.C. Case Study Task Force 
Meeting, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria. September. 
B e t t n ~ a m ,  J. 1979. A n  I n f o r m a t i o n  Process ing  Theory  of C o n s u m e r  Choice. 
Reading. Mass: Addison Wesley. 
Cyert, R. and J. Marc5. 1963. A Behav iora l  Theory  of t h e  F i n n .  Englewood 
Cliffs. N..J.: Prsntice Hall. 
D a ,  :,;. L.N. 1979. F r o z e n  Fire.  (Friends of the  Earth). 
DOE/ERA 1977. Opin ion  a n d  Order o n  I m p o r t a t i o n  of L iquef ied  h r a t u r a l  Gas  
f r o m  I n d o n e s i a  Op in ion  N u m b e r  One. Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Energy. 
Deutsch, R.W. 1980. "Siting an  L.N.G. Facility in California: The Regulatory 
Framework and the Factors Involved in the Decision Making Process." 
Paper prepared for t h e  L.E.C. Case Study Task Force Meeting, IIASA, 
Laxenburg. Austria, September. 
Fairley, W. 1977. "Evaluating the 'Small' Probability of a Catastrophic Accident 
from the  Marine Transport of Liquefied Natural Gas," in Fairley and 
Mosteller (eds.), S t  a t i s t i c s  a n d  Pub l i c  Policy,  Reading, Mass: Addison 
Wesley. 
Fischhofl. B., P. Slovic, and S. Lichtenstein. (in press). "Lay Foibles and Expert 
Fables in Judgments about Risk." in T. O'bordan and R.K. Turner 
(eds.), Progress in Resource Management and Environment  Planning,  
Vol. 3., Chichester: Wiley. 
Hersey, J., H. Kunreuther, and P. Schoemaker. 1980. "Two-Piece von Neumann- 
Morgenstern Utility Functions: Some Methodological and Empirical 
Observations." Department of Decision Sciences Working Paper. Whar- 
ton School, University of Pennsylvania, July 
Jackson, J., and H. Kunreuther. 1980. "Low Probability Events and Determining 
Acceptable Risk: The Case of Nuclear Regulation," (mimeo). 
Keen, P.. and M. Scott Morton. 1978. Decision S u p p w t  S y s t e m :  A n  O ~ g a n i z a -  
tional Perspective. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley. 
Keeney, R. 1980. S f t i n g  Energy  Facilities. New York: Academic Press 
Keeney, R., and H. Raiffa. 1976. Decisions w i th  Multiple Objectives. New York: 
John Wiley. 
Keeney, K ,  R Kulkarn. and K. Nair. 1979. "A Risk Analysis of cn LNG Terminal." 
Omega, 7: 191-205 
Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borka, and N. Katz. 
1978. Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. New York: 
John Wiley. 
Lathrop. John. 1980. "The Role of Risk Assessment in Facility Siting: An Exam- 
ple from California," WP-80-150, Laxenburg. Austria: International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), October. 
Lawless, J. 1977. Technology and  Social Shock. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Lindblom, C. 1959. "The Science of Muddling Through." Public Adminis trat ion 
Review 19: 79-Ce. 
L i ~ d ' . l o m ,  C. 1965. The IntelEigence of Democracy. New York: MacMillan. 
Linnerooth, J. 1980. "A Short History of the California LNG Terminal." WP-90- 
155, Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA, November. 
Majone, N. 1979. "Process and Outcome in Regulatory Decisions." Amer ic zn  
Behavoral S c i a t i s t  22:56 1-583. 
March, J. 1978. "Bounded Rationality. Ambiguity and the Engineering of 
Choice," Bell Journal  of Economics 9:587-608, Spring. 
March, J.. and J. Olsen. 1976. Ambigui ty  and Choice in Organizations. Bergen, 
Norway: Universtetsforlaget. 
Mitroff, l., J. Emshoff, and R Kilmann. 1979. "Assumptional Analysis: -4 Metho- 
dology for Strategic Problem Solving," Management Science, 6:583-533. 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). 1977. T r a m p o r f a t i o n  of Liquefied 
N a t u r a l  Cas .  Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment. 
Simon, H. 1978. "On How to Decide What to Do," Bell  Journal  of Economics 
9:494-507, Spring. 
Starr. C. 1989. "Social Benefit versus Technological Risk," Sc ience  165: 1232-38. 
Stokey, E.,and R. Zeckhauser. 1978. Primer f w  Po l i cy  Ana lys i s .  New York: Nor- 
ton. 
Tversky, A.. and D. Kahneman. 1974. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases." Science  183: 1124-31. 
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. (in press). "The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice," Science .  
Walker, J. 1977. "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem 
Selection." B r i t i s h  Jounurl  of Political Science  7:423-445. 
